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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 January 1951

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 341

SUBJECT: Political Alignments and Major Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities in the Event of War before July 1951

Note: This memorandum is a revision of IM-288 and was prepared at the request of the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff as a summary estimate.

SUMMARY

1. The outbreak of a general war before July 1951 is assumed for the purposes of this estimate.

2. In the assumed circumstances, the immediate Soviet purpose in resorting to war would be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the Western Powers and to ensure the security of the USSR by military occupation of Western Europe and such areas in Asia as the USSR considers essential to its grand strategy.

3. The USSR regards political and psychological warfare as integral rather than incidental in the waging of war. Not only would considerable Soviet capabilities in this respect be exploited to the utmost to facilitate military operations, but the military operations themselves would be designed to support and facilitate political revolution.

4. In important respects the USSR is itself vulnerable to political and psychological warfare, but these vulnerabilities are latent and could not be exploited fully until the mechanism of Soviet police control had been disrupted and effective Allied support of disaffected elements was at hand.

5. The allies of the USSR would be the European Satellite States (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania), and China. Several of these Soviet allies are vulnerable to psychological warfare, and their proximity to Western base areas increases the potentialities for exploitation.

Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. It contains information available to CIA as of 18 December 1950.

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6. The non-Soviet position in Korea is precarious and Southeast Asia is in jeopardy, since Communist-led insurgents already are well established in Indochina, which could be brought under Communist complete control before July 1951. The status of Yugoslavia, Germany, Austria, and Japan is also uncertain, although the Western position with respect to these countries is less precarious than the position in East Asia.

7. The nations allied or aligned with the United States would be:

a. [REDACTED] Iceland, Norway, Denmark, [REDACTED] the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and Portugal, with their overseas possessions.

b. Other recipients of US military aid: Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Philippines.

c. [REDACTED] South Africa, Ceylon,

d. Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq (the British Arab allies); and Saudi Arabia.

e. The other American republics.

8. India and all other nations would probably be initially neutral. None would be sympathetic with the USSR or likely to join it in aggression. Most would be disposed to resist Soviet attack, and would look to the United States for aid. A few might eventually be persuaded to become belligerent allies of the United States, even if not attacked.

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**POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
VULNERABILITIES IN THE EVENT OF WAR BEFORE JULY 1951**

THE USSR

1. Assumptions.

The outbreak of a general war before July 1951 is assumed for the purposes of this estimate. Such an occurrence is conceivable only as the result of Soviet initiative. The assumption of a Soviet decision to resort to war within the period under consideration implies the further assumption of conviction on the part of Soviet leaders that: (a) the progressive economic recovery, political coalescence, and military rehabilitation of Western Europe, in alliance with the United States, posed an intolerable threat to the achievement of the strategic objectives of the USSR; (b) it had become imperative to act before the relative strength of the West had been further enhanced; (c) the trend toward the strengthening of the West could be reversed by a war envisaged as limited in time and scope; and (d) the USSR had sufficient military power to win such a war.

2. Soviet War Aims.

In the assumed circumstances, the immediate Soviet purpose in resorting to war would be to smash the alliance of the Western Powers and to ensure the security of the USSR by military occupation of Western Europe and such areas in Asia as the USSR considers essential to its grand strategy. Corollary objectives would be to seize and convert to Soviet use the resources of the conquered area, thus greatly enhancing the potential strength of the USSR in relation to that of the surviving capitalist states, and to reconstruct the conquered states as Satellites similar to those now in Eastern Europe.

3. Capabilities for Political and Psychological Warfare.

In the Soviet concept, Communist and capitalist states are engaged in a continuing struggle, with each side utilizing all economic, political and psychological means available. Armed conflict, though not lightly undertaken by either side, is regarded by the Communist state as merely the employment of more forceful means in the conduct of this continuing struggle. Thus, if the USSR resorts to armed aggression, psychological warfare will be regarded as an integral and basic part of the business of waging total war.

In conducting political and psychological warfare, the Kremlin has at its disposal not only the apparatus of the Soviet state, but also that of the international Communist movement, in which every disciplined Communist is required to pay primary and undeviating allegiance to the interests of the USSR.

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The agencies of Soviet propaganda, Soviet diplomacy, and Communist agitation are constantly at work trying to spread disillusionment and disaffection in the non-Soviet world, discredit non-Soviet governments, create antagonisms among them, and undermine the will and capacity of non-Soviet peoples and governments to resist in the event of war. Thus the way would have been prepared for presenting the USSR in time of war as the invincible champion of the peace-loving and oppressed masses, compelled by the machinations of capitalist warmongers to act in self-defense for the secure establishment of peace and democracy. The USSR would seek to paralyze resistance through sabotage, labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny, and rebellion. Its particular targets would be industrial labor, the naive elements of the intelligentsia, self-conscious minorities, colonial populations, the armed forces, and (through utilization of the peace campaign) the susceptible elements of the middle classes. Sabotage would be directed against military installations, transportation and communications facilities, other public utilities, war industries, and stocks of essential commodities. Communist penetration of industrial labor has been conducted with this end in view and, despite all precautions, would present a serious threat, particularly in France and Italy.

In areas under direct Soviet attack the hard core of militant Communists must also be expected to provide active fifth-column support for Soviet military operations.

Finally, in the wake of the Soviet advance, the surviving Communists would be joined by others with special training for the establishment of police control and civil administration. Despite the absolute power of the USSR as military conqueror, every effort would be made, as previously in Eastern Europe, to present conquest as liberation and the resultant Communist regime as the product of a genuine popular revolution. The purpose would be to convert the conquered communities into allies as quickly as possible through the familiar device of the Satellite state.

4. Psychological Readiness for War.

The Russian people's recent experience of war has given them reason to dread it, despite the ultimate triumph of the USSR. They have been taught, however, to expect attack by the capitalist world. Whatever the actual case, the USSR would attribute the war to capitalist aggression, and few Soviet citizens would be in a position to know better. Since the end of World War II the Soviet Government has conducted a systematic campaign of internal propaganda designed to whip up popular hatred of the Western world, particularly the US. The coercive powers of the Soviet Government, together with an intensive effort to persuade the Soviet peoples that national survival depended on successful prosecution of the war, would cause the Soviet people to support the war effort, particularly if initial victories stimulated their patriotism and their hopes of gaining a better standard of living as a result of the spoils of victory.

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5. Potential Sources of Disaffection.

In addition to the reluctance of the Soviet people to undergo the rigors of a new war, three principal bases of potential disaffection exist in the USSR:

- a. General disillusionment, and resentment as a result of the exactions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic of the Soviet state control machinery.
- b. The peasants' resentment of collectivization. The German Army found that the rural population would support even a foreign invader in anticipation that he would abolish the collective farms and distribute the land on a basis of private ownership.
- c. The hostility of minority nationalities toward Great Russian domination. For instance, sporadic resistance still occurs in the areas recently annexed to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics. The main areas of potential disaffection are the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia.

6. Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare.

These potential sources of disaffection normally are kept under effective control through isolation of the Soviet people, internal propaganda, economic coercion, Communist monopoly of political power, and, above all, police terrorism. However, the unrepresentative character of the government, its high degree of centralization, and its ultimate dependence on police coercion are specific weaknesses of the Soviet system. If the mechanism of close governmental control were broken, disintegration would set in wherever there were energetic local leaders and where local populations were armed.

So long as Soviet military operations appeared to be meeting with complete success and the internal security mechanism remained intact, no serious hindrance to the Soviet war effort would result from the latent disaffection within the USSR. If Soviet internal propaganda were disproved by events -- especially if Allied capabilities proved greater than expected, and Soviet capabilities less -- Soviet morale would be adversely affected, but the effect would not be decisive. The latent disaffection existing within the USSR could bring about a crippling disintegration of the Soviet war effort only if the Soviet control mechanism were thoroughly disrupted and if effective Allied support of disaffected groups were immediately at hand.

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SOVIET SATELLITES

7. The European Satellite States.

At the outset of war, and so long as Soviet operations were successful, the European Satellite governments would of necessity support the USSR. Wholesale defections from the Satellite armed forces would be unlikely to occur in these circumstances, but the reliability of the forces would be questionable, and their utility would be strictly limited.

The majority of the people of the Satellite States, however, resent the domination of the USSR and are hostile toward the Communist regimes imposed on them. Many of them would welcome war in the hope of eventual liberation. The outbreak of hostilities might occasion sporadic acts of open resistance, which would, however, be ruthlessly suppressed. In the circumstances, most popular resistance would be passive, consisting of slowdowns, concealment of produce, draft-dodging, and other forms of non-cooperation. Active resistance for the most part would take the form of clandestine counter-propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and acts of terrorism. Substantial guerrilla resistance could be expected only in Poland, where a large security force would be required to keep it within bounds.

This situation would be radically altered if the USSR were to appear to be losing the war and if advancing Allied forces were in a position to render effective support to popular resistance in the Satellite States. The Satellite armed forces, and even the rank-and-file of Satellite Communists, would become increasingly unreliable. Defections and popular insurrection would occur wherever there was prospect of immediate Allied support and early liberation by Allied armed forces. The Satellites in proximity to Allied base areas and to the lines of approach of Allied armies would become distinct liabilities rather than assets to the Soviet war effort. In the face of the rising tide of patriotic anti-Communist reactions, however, Satellite officials would perceive no future for themselves apart from the fortunes of the USSR and would accordingly try to maintain a desperate resistance as long as possible.

8. Vulnerabilities.

The Soviet position in the European Satellite States is vulnerable to psychological warfare aimed at exploiting the deep-rooted resentments that exist in varying degrees throughout the Satellite area. First among these is resentment against the enforced subordination of Satellite national will to Soviet interests. Even in Communist circles there is some discontent over the forceful transformation of the economic structure of Eastern Europe to fit into Soviet master-plans, the lowering of standards of living, and the failure of the USSR to meet the industrial needs of the Satellite economies. In addition, there is resentment on the part of leaders and members of the various religious organizations (particularly on the part of the Catholic Church) currently under attack in the Soviet campaign to neutralize religious influence throughout the Satellite States. A third form of strong anti-Soviet feeling is the resentment of the peasantry against

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the initial steps that have been taken and especially against the blueprint for the eventual collectivization of agriculture. All these sources of dissatisfaction with Soviet domination blend in with the strong undercurrent of national sentiment that opposes foreign control simply because it is foreign. The repeated Moscow-managed purges of the Satellite Communist parties indicate the Kremlin's awareness of the dangers inherent in Eastern European nationalism, but the basic causes of discontent will be augmented rather than eradicated by any intensification of this control-tightening process. A rupture of Soviet controls, therefore, would permit widespread anti-Soviet activities.

Albania, by virtue of its exposed geographical position and the relative instability of the present regime, is the most vulnerable of the Satellite States to Western efforts to loosen the Soviet grip in Eastern Europe. Poland, with 95 percent of its population Catholic, and with the inexpressible nationalism of the Polish people making itself felt even in the highest councils of the local Communist Party, probably is most vulnerable to psychological pressures and may well be the most enduring source of dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe. On the other side of the scale, Rumania, where Soviet control already is virtually complete, is least likely to break away from the Soviet yoke until liberation is a fact rather than a hopeful prospect.

9. The Position of Communist China.

The Chinese Communist regime is firmly aligned with the USSR and would prove a reliable and valuable ally in the event of war during 1941. The Chinese Communist regime possesses capabilities to pursue a comparatively independent policy, but, at present, there is no convincing evidence of a Chinese Communist disposition to assert such capabilities. The position of the Peiping regime, as frequently and publicly asserted, is that the world is divided into two camps, that China's interests are inextricably bound to those of the USSR, and that China is allied with the USSR in the common cause of communizing the world.

Communist China is formally committed to support the USSR, in the event of war, by the terms of the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950. In addition to the published provisions of the treaty, which are similar to those of Soviet-Satellite treaties, it is highly probable that unpublished protocols provide for extensive political, economic and military cooperation in preparation for hostilities with the non-Communist world. For more than a year, several thousand Soviet advisers and technicians, attached to every important part of the Chinese Communist political, economic and military apparatus, have been strengthening China's capabilities for effective participation in the Soviet bloc; at the same time, the capabilities of Communist China for taking action independent of the USSR have been reduced.

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Communist China, from the time of its intervention in the Korean conflict, in October 1950, has been openly engaged in limited hostilities with the non-Communist world. The Peiping regime has persisted in this militant policy, and has even increased its commitment in Korea, in spite of the prospect of UN retaliation. Moreover, Communist China has embarked, over the past several months, on an extensive program of mobilization. Peiping's propaganda has also been preparing the Chinese people for the imminent extension of hostilities, and for eventual global hostilities.

It is doubtful that there is any significant difference in opinion, in regard to the regime's commitment to the Soviet bloc, among the members of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo. The Central Committee is clearly dominated by the Stalinists; there has been no reliable confirmation of reports of the disaffection of certain major field commanders. The party members have probably been impelled primarily by nationalist sentiment, but the Party's high command is making strenuous efforts to indoctrinate the rank and file with the tenets of Stalinism and to purge from the Party the opportunists and irreconcilables.

On this basis it is anticipated that, in the event of expanded or global hostilities, the resources and facilities of Communist China would be freely available to the USSR, and that both strategic and political considerations would require Chinese Communist participation in the conflict.

In this event, the actual benefits the USSR would gain from Chinese belligerency might be limited by the vulnerability of the Peiping regime to external propaganda attack, which might well be supported by internal subversive activities. The most profitable theme for such an attack on the Peiping regime would be the contention that China's involvement in war was a result of the Peiping regime's subjection to foreign control. Evidence of popular dissatisfaction with the present degree of Soviet control have already become apparent. Soviet exploitation of the Chinese economy for war purposes would also increase the vulnerability of the Peiping regime. Popular acceptance of the Chinese Communist regime has been partly based on the promise of peace to an utterly war-weary people and partly on a promise of economic rehabilitation and political reform. The regime's failure to fulfill these promises and the resultant continued domestic turmoil (including widespread guerrilla and bandit activity) and the diversion of effort to the support of Soviet-directed international ventures involving costly military operations could be profitably exploited through propaganda. There are also traditional regional and local sentiments particularly in South China that could be exploited either to influence or to embarrass and impede the Peiping regime. The combination of anti-foreign sentiment, war-weariness, and general reluctance to support an administration until it has demonstrated capability and willingness to carry out its promises, would constitute a weakness in the event that China found itself at war on the side of the USSR.

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Partially offsetting these vulnerabilities are Peiping's monopoly of public information and its apparatus of police controls. Peiping's current propaganda, in an effort to prepare the Chinese for a war with the West, is stimulating Chinese hatred of US past and present "aggression" against China, provoking Chinese contempt for US "inner weakness," and exploiting racial animosity. Increasingly vigorous measures are being adopted to cut off the flow of counter-information. Peiping's apparatus of police controls, now being strengthened as a part of the general mobilization program, is well developed throughout China except in those parts of the south and southwest where the "pacification" of local opposition elements is still incomplete.

NATIONS PRECARIOUSLY ALIGNED

10. Non-Soviet East Asia-

The situation in Korea is fluid, but the area will probably be under complete Soviet control, or at least the UN position there will remain extremely precarious during the first six months of 1951.

The situation in Indochina is also precarious, and is approaching the point of crisis. A Communist triumph here would jeopardize other parts of Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand. In Indochina, French refusal to grant full independence has prevented the French-sponsored Bao Dai regime from gaining any wide popular support. A Nationalist insurrection under Communist leadership gravely threatens continued French control. The military situation is such that even the most unequivocal French concessions to Nationalist sentiment, coupled with extensive outside military assistance, would have now but a slight chance of effectively reducing the strength of the insurgents. It is entirely possible that most of Indochina will have passed to Communist control by July 1951.

Although the Thailand Government has professed its adherence to the Western cause and is accepting US military aid, Thailand's tradition of accommodation to the prevailing power remains strong. Should Thailand be threatened by an invasion from Communist China, extensive US/UN support of Thailand's territorial integrity would be necessary to insure continued pro-West orientation. Should Indochina fall to Communist control before July 1951, or should global war occur before that time, Thailand would re-examine its position in light of its estimate of relative East-West capabilities.

Burma has made noteworthy progress toward internal stability during the past several months, but is wholly incapable of defending itself against foreign aggression or resisting the pressure of Communist China and triumphant Communism should it spread through the rest of mainland Southeast Asia. The status of Malaya will depend mainly on the status of British power in the area, but police control of the local Communists would become much more difficult if Communist influence were to become entrenched in Thailand.

The most powerful political force throughout Southeast Asia is not Communism but an intense nationalism directed initially against European imperialism. Communism has flourished mainly because of its identification with this force. By the same token, were Communism to become identified with Chinese imperialism, or, more remotely, with Soviet imperialism, the force of nationalism could be turned against Communism.

11. Yugoslavia.

The Tito regime in Yugoslavia occupies an awkward and somewhat precarious position as the only Communist regime to reject the role of Satellite and survive. Although attempting to maintain an orthodox domestic Communist policy, Yugoslavia is finding itself the target of increasingly hostile Soviet pressures. Deteriorating economic conditions caused by severe drought have contributed to the difficulties of the Tito Government. The USSR, moreover, will probably intensify its efforts to overthrow the Yugoslav Government by encouraging the growth of discontent within Yugoslavia and difference of opinion among Yugoslav Communists over Tito's current policies. There is no conclusive evidence that the USSR or Cominform countries plan armed aggression against Yugoslavia, but a steady buildup of Cominform military strength is taking place in the Balkans and Soviet-Satellite propaganda is emphasizing the charge that a Western-backed Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc constitutes an immediate and aggressive threat to the Cominform nations in the Balkans.

Even though the Yugoslav leaders have demonstrated their disillusionment with the USSR and its postwar policies, they still find that ideological considerations prevent open alliance with the Western Powers. However, Soviet pressure and Yugoslavia's need for economic and military assistance are gradually bringing Tito into closer association with the West. At the same time, Tito's aspirations to develop a form of Communism "purified" of Soviet deviationism and to find supporters inside the Soviet orbit are reflected in his preoccupation with the status of Mao Tse-Tung in China and Ho Chi Minh in Indochina. Although the USSR will probably be able to prevent the spread of the Titoist heresy to other areas within the Soviet sphere, the Yugoslav heresy acts as a constant irritant to World Communism.

Yugoslavia is still attempting to maintain a policy of neutrality, but is moving toward a closer alignment with the West and might cooperate with the West in the event of an outbreak of general hostilities between the West and the USSR. In the event of an attack by the USSR, the Yugoslavs would offer stubborn resistance, but would be dependent on substantial material aid from the West.

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13. Austria.

In Austria the only serious vulnerability tending to offset the fundamental Austrian inclination toward an open alliance with the West is the considerable sense of hopelessness concerning the possibility of military resistance to the USSR.

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ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS

15. The North Atlantic Treaty States.

In the event of war between the US and the USSR involving an attack on the North Atlantic Treaty area, the governments of the NAT nations

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would probably honor their commitments, particularly if the US had made every reasonable concession to avoid war. In the event of war involving one or more of them elsewhere than in Europe, the continental European NAT members, fearing invasion, would probably try to avoid becoming involved.

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For the short term under consideration the continental states will lack the means of effective resistance. Not only will they be acutely conscious of their vulnerability, but promises of eventual liberation and ultimate victory will not of themselves produce a determination to resist. Although the strong stand of the US in the Korean affair and the start toward Western rearmament have given evidence that the US intends to stand firmly on its own commitments, and have tended to improve somewhat this critical morale aspect, the crucial factor in the determination of the European NAT members to stand by the treaty in the event of war in 1951 remains their ability successfully to do so. There would be little chance of effective military resistance on the continent in the event of war before July 1951.

Militant Communist elements in these states must be expected to serve as an active fifth column supporting the Soviet attack. Their strength is estimated at approximately 200,000 in Italy, 70,000 in France, 12,000 in Belgium, 8,000 in the Netherlands, 6,000 in Denmark and 4,000 in Norway. The numbers who could be expected to engage in open violence, however, would be less, and, unless they received prompt Soviet military support, they could probably be controlled. Local Communist capabilities in Denmark and Norway are limited to espionage and sabotage. In Portugal the Communist organization is small and ineffective.

Except for Indochina (see 10 above), the colonial territories of the North Atlantic Treaty powers will be generally secure, although Communist guerrilla activity will continue in Malaya and there is likely to be unrest in French North Africa, British East and West Africa, Cyprus, Eritrea, Madagascar, Macao, Malaya, and Hong Kong.

16. Other Recipients of US Military Aid.

Greece, Turkey, Iran, and the Philippines, which look to the US for support and protection, would resist direct Soviet aggression to the best of their ability. If, in the event of an East-West war, they themselves were not directly attacked, the position of each would be determined largely by such considerations as treaty obligations, the degree of Western support received, the proximity of the war to its own borders, and the extent of Western successes. If asked to assume a belligerent role, Greece and probably Turkey would agree, and certainly neither country would be likely to pursue for long a policy which might jeopardize its future relations with the Western Democracies. In the period before July 1951, the present trend toward neutrality in Iran probably will not change the Iranian

disposition to cooperate with the West, so long as general war does not break out, but Iran would seek to avoid active involvement in hostilities against the USSR.

17. The American Republics.

The other American republics would be aligned with the United States in varying degrees of effective cooperation. The Rio Treaty requires immediate assistance to an American state attacked in the Western Hemisphere as defined, the form of assistance to be whatever each other state deems appropriate. It also requires consultation regarding appropriate collective measures, particularly in the case of military action outside of the Western Hemisphere. Co-belligerence is not required, and wide variation may exist in the action taken by various states. Some would be disposed to accept active military roles. None of the present American governments would favor the USSR.

18. The Arab States.

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Saudi Arabia probably would align itself with the US in the early stages of any general war and would cooperate to the limited extent that Arabian capabilities permitted. Syria and Lebanon are too weak to pursue an independent policy and probably would adopt a passive role in alignment with the West. The Arab states in general would provide comparatively little military strength for the area under any circumstances, but they would align themselves with the West in preference to the USSR.

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NATIONS INITIALLY NEUTRAL

20. India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan probably would remain non-belligerent for the time being, although otherwise cooperative. India would cooperate, somewhat grudgingly, because of the necessity of maintaining her foreign trade

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patterns with the West. Pakistan would cooperate as a matter of choice. Both countries would expect Commonwealth support if they themselves should be directly threatened, and they would resist Soviet or Chinese attack.

21. Indonesia.

Indonesia will endeavor to remain neutral in the event of war before July 1951. Although the Indonesians are cognizant of UN and US assistance in their struggle for independence, they remain suspicious that the West has lingering colonial ambitions. Furthermore, they believe that a neutral status is necessary for the solution of their many domestic problems.

22. Finland.

The Finnish people are firmly anti-Soviet, but Finland is in no position to defy the USSR. The Finnish Government, therefore, without repudiating the Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance treaty, would seek to remain neutral, or at least to avoid Soviet occupation of Finnish territory. The Finns would not willingly assist the USSR, and, if Soviet forces entered their territory without express permission, they would fight. In any case, Soviet forces entering Finland would be in hostile territory.

23. Other European Neutrals: Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, and Spain.

Sweden and Switzerland are ideologically anti-Soviet, but both cling to a traditional neutrality in the hope of avoiding Soviet attack. If attacked, both would resist to their utmost ability.

Ireland is strongly anti-Soviet in sentiment, but the government insists that any formal alignment including the United Kingdom is impossible without the cession of Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland; even with such an arrangement, Ireland is inclined to remain neutral.

The Franco regime is fundamentally and conspicuously anti-Soviet, but is ideologically unacceptable to Western Europe. In the event of war, Spain would seek an alliance with the Atlantic Powers, particularly the US, probably attempting to obtain economic and military concessions in return for its alignment.

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25. Afghanistan.

In dangerous proximity to the USSR and remote from succor, Afghanistan would remain neutral unless attacked, in which case effective resistance could not be prolonged.

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